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OPINION

SMITH, Circuit Judge.
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The University of the Virgin Islands (“UVI”) charged
Stephen McCauley, a UVI student, with violating provisions of
its Student Code of Conduct (the “Code”) for his alleged
harassment of an individual who had accused his friend of rape.
In response, McCauley filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against
UVI; its president, Dr. LaVerne Ragster; and its housing
director, Sean Georges, alleging that various Code provisions
violated the First Amendment. After a bench trial, the District
Court dismissed all claims against UVI because it was not a
“person” for purposes of § 1983, determined that Ragster and
Georges were acting in their official capacities as UVI
employees and were not “persons” for purposes of § 1983, ruled
that one Code provision, Major Infraction Paragraph E, was
facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, and
enjoined Ragster and Georges from enforcing the offending
paragraph.
McCauley now appeals the District Court’s (1)
conclusion that UVI, Ragster, and Georges are not “persons” for
purposes of § 1983, (2) conclusion that certain Code provisions
do not violate the First Amendment, and (3) failure to address
his as-applied challenge to Major Infraction Paragraph E, the
Code provision UVI charged him with violating.1

1

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under
48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3

After reviewing the record, we agree with the District
Court on the first and third issues. UVI is an arm of the
Territory of the Virgin Islands and, therefore, not a “person” for
purposes of § 1983. Ragster and Georges, as employees of UVI
acting in their official capacities, were likewise not “persons”
for purposes of § 1983. Adjudication of McCauley’s as-applied
challenge to Major Infraction Paragraph E was unnecessary
because the District Court had already concluded that the
paragraph was facially unconstitutional. The District Court
went astray, however, in its adjudication of McCauley’s other
challenges to the Code. Setting aside Major Infraction
Paragraph E, two of the four remaining challenged provisions
were unconstitutional infringements on students’ First
Amendment right to free speech. Based on these conclusions
we will affirm the District Court in part and reverse in part.
I.
At all times relevant to this appeal, McCauley was a
student at UVI, Ragster was the president of UVI, and Georges
was the housing director of UVI. During McCauley’s time at
UVI, the Code governed, inter alia, student speech.
On September 30, 2005, McCauley and other UVI
students went to a local beach. Two students who were with
McCauley, Josh Carlson and Jenna Piasecki, broke off from the
group and a sexual act occurred between them. The next day,
Carlson was charged with raping Piasecki. After learning of
4

that charge, McCauley visited Piasecki’s dorm room to talk to
her about the alleged rape. Piasecki complained to UVI officials
after the visit that McCauley harassed her.
Later that month, UVI officials twice warned McCauley
to avoid contact with Piasecki. Georges told McCauley that
Piasecki had complained of harassment and that he should stay
away from her to avoid repercussions under the Code.
McCauley was later approached by other UVI officials and was
warned to avoid all contact with Piasecki. On or about
November 7, 2005, UVI charged McCauley with violating
Major Infraction Paragraph E of the Code and began
disciplinary proceedings against him.2
Major Infraction
Paragraph E prohibits:
Committing, conspiring to commit, or causing to
be committed any act which causes or is likely to
cause serious physical or mental harm or which
tends to injure or actually injures, frightens,
demeans, degrades or disgraces any person. This
includes but is not limited to violation of the
University policies on hazing, sexual harassment
or sexual assault.

2

The Code distinguished between major, general, and
minor infractions. The maximum sanction for each was
expulsion, suspension, and disciplinary probation, respectively.
5

McCauley pled not guilty to the charge.
Shortly after receiving notice of the charge against him,
McCauley filed a § 1983 suit against UVI, Georges, Ragster,
and other unidentified defendants for violating his First
Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of association.
McCauley challenged, inter alia, the constitutionality of Major
Infraction Paragraphs C (“Paragraph C”), E (“Paragraph E”),
and R (“Paragraph R”), General Infraction Paragraph B
(“Paragraph B”), and Minor Infraction Paragraph H (“Paragraph
H”). He alleged that all the paragraphs were facially
unconstitutional and that Paragraph E was unconstitutional as
applied to him.
After McCauley received notice of the charge against
him, he was criminally charged with witness tampering, and
UVI agreed to postpone its disciplinary hearing against him until
the criminal charges were resolved. On March 31, 2009, after
the criminal charges were resolved, UVI sent McCauley a
second notice of charges, which listed the same charges from the
November 2005 notice and added violations of UVI’s drug and
alcohol policy. The second notice stated that the Paragraph E
charge was based on (1) McCauley’s visit to Piasecki’s dorm
room on the day Carlson was charged with rape; (2) an allegedly
harassing phone call McCauley made to Piasecki on October 18,
2005; and (3) McCauley’s alleged harassment of Piasecki at an
off-campus bar on October 20, 2005.

6

On April 28, 2009, McCauley was found guilty of
violating Paragraph E and another paragraph not at issue in this
appeal. As punishment, he was ordered to write a letter of
apology to Piasecki and pay a $200 fine.
The next month, a non-jury trial was conducted on
McCauley’s § 1983 action. On August 21, 2009, the District
Court: dismissed all claims against UVI because it was not a
“person” under § 1983, entered judgment in favor of McCauley
on his facial challenge to Paragraph E, enjoined Ragster, as
president of UVI, and Georges, as housing director of UVI,
from enforcing Paragraph E, and entered judgment in favor of
the defendants on McCauley’s other claims. McCauley filed a
notice of appeal on September 18, 2009.
II.
McCauley asserted facial challenges against Paragraphs
B, C, E, H, and R. At trial, he conceded that he had suffered no
deprivations from Paragraphs B, C, H, and R. For example,
during cross-examination McCauley was asked, “[H]ave you
suffered a deprivation in any way in connection with
[Paragraph] R?” He replied, “no.” McCauley made similar
concessions for the other paragraphs.3

3

For Paragraph B, McCauley admitted that he did not
wish to express himself “in an obscene, lewd, [or] indecent
manner[.]” He also conceded that he did not want to “verbally
7

These concessions raise concerns about McCauley’s
standing to assert the claims alleged in his complaint. Because
“we are required to raise issues of standing sua sponte if such
issues exist,” Addiction Specialists, Inc v. Twp. of Hampton, 411
F.3d 399, 405 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted),
before considering the merits of this appeal, we first consider
whether McCauley has standing.4
Our inquiry into Paragraph E is promptly resolved.
McCauley obviously has standing to challenge Paragraph E, as
UVI charged him with violating that paragraph. The other
paragraphs, however, require closer examination. Litigants
asserting facial challenges involving overbreadth under the First
Amendment have standing where “their own rights of free
expression are [not] violated” because “of a judicial prediction
or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or expression.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
assault others on [UVI] property.” When McCauley was asked
whether he had “suffered a deprivation of any kind” due to
Paragraph H, he replied “no.” McCauley similarly conceded
that he had not suffered any deprivation in connection with
Paragraph C.
4

“We exercise plenary review of standing issues, but
review the factual elements underlying the District Court’s
determination of standing on a clear error standard.” Goode v.
City of Philadelphia, 539 F.3d 311, 316 (3d Cir. 2008).
8

612 (1973); Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 363 (3d Cir.
2000) (“[W]hen a plaintiff attempts to challenge a statute as
being an overbroad restriction on First Amendment rights, the
requirement that an impediment exist to the third party asserting
his or her own rights should be relaxed[.]”) (citing Sec’y of Md.
v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 956-57 (1984));
Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 753 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The
Supreme Court rather freely grants standing to raise overbreadth
claims, on the ground that an overbroad . . . regulation may chill
the expression of others not before the court.”).5
Despite McCauley’s trial testimony that he suffered no
deprivations from Paragraphs B, H, and R, we conclude that he
has standing to challenge those paragraphs. The “judicial
prediction or assumption” that Paragraphs B, H, and R “may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression,” Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612,
was not disturbed by McCauley’s testimony. Ideally, McCauley
would have responded to questions at trial regarding injury by

5

McCauley’s Complaint explicitly alleges the chilling of
student speech as a harm:
The [Code] has a chilling effect on Plaintiff’s and
other students’ right to freely and openly engage
in appropriate discussions on theories, beliefs,
ideas, and to debate such ideas with persons
holding opposing viewpoints.
9

stating that his speech and the speech of other students was
chilled by the Code. Yet his failure to provide this lawyerly
response is not fatal to his claims, given that we should “freely
grant[] standing to raise overbreadth claims[.]” Amato, 952 F.2d
at 753. Paragraphs B, H, and R, all have the potential to chill
protected speech. Paragraph B prohibits, inter alia, lewd or
indecent conduct. Paragraph H prohibits conduct which causes
emotional distress, including “conduct . . . which compels the
victim to seek assistance in dealing with the distress.”
Paragraph R prohibits misbehavior at sports events, concerts,
and social-cultural events, including the display of unauthorized
or offensive signs. As such, under the “relaxed” rules of
standing for First Amendment overbreadth claims, Pitt News,
215 F.3d at 363, McCauley has standing to assert facial
challenges to those paragraphs.
McCauley lacks standing to challenge Paragraph C,
which requires students to report witnessed violations of Major
Infraction Paragraph B. Paragraph C, and its companion
paragraph, Major Infraction Paragraph B, state:
B.

Assault/Infliction or Threat of Bodily
Harm to a Person:
This includes inflicting or
threatening to inflict bodily harm or
coercing or restraining any person
while on or about University
premises.
This also includes
10

brandishing of weapons.
C.

Aiding and Abetting or Complicity in
Threatening B odily H arm and/or
Committing Bodily Harm to a Person:
This includes conspiring with or
knowingly helping or encouraging
another person to engage in the
a b o v e m e n t i o n e d b e h a v io r
violations [in Major Infraction
Paragraph B]. Students present
during the commission of an act(s)
by another which constitutes those
kinds of behavior violations
mentioned above [in M ajor
Infraction Paragraph B] and who
fail to report such act(s) to the
proper University authorities shall
be guilty of complicity to commit
bodily harm to a person.

At trial, McCauley stated that he and other students were
harmed by the imposition of Paragraph C’s reporting
requirement:
THE COURT:

Mr. McCauley, when you
read paragraph C, is there
something you feel you’re
deprived of? And if so, tell
11

us what it is.
[MCCAULEY]:

I believe that just because
someone is present when a
violation is being
committed, but does not
report that person, it
basically implies that a
student has to enforce the
provisions of the Code of
Conduct at all times, and I
don’t believ e tha t’s
necessary.

McCauley’s Complaint alleges that Paragraph C requires
“students place themselves in harms-way by being compelled to
act as snitches for the University[.]”
Unlike the other challenged paragraphs, which punish
speech, the injury from Paragraph C identified by McCauley is
grounded in having to report violations of Major Infraction
Paragraph B. Paragraph C’s reporting requirement does not
prohibit speech so there is no risk that it “may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech
or expression.” Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612. Therefore, we will
remand the facial challenge to Paragraph C to the District Court
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for dismissal for lack of standing.6
III.
McCauley’s first challenge is to the District Court’s
conclusion that UVI, Georges, and Ragster were not “persons”
for the purposes of § 1983.7 Although the caption of
McCauley’s Complaint purports to sue Georges and Ragster in
their official and individual capacities, it does not allege that
either individual committed any wrongful acts in their individual
capacities nor did the evidence at trial reveal any such wrongful
acts. Accordingly, any § 1983 claim asserted against Georges
and Ragster must be based on their official actions as UVI
employees and turns on whether UVI is an instrumentality of the
Virgin Islands.
Territories and their officers, acting in their official
6

In so doing, we do not rule out the possibility that a
plaintiff alleging a different injury could have standing to assert
a facial overbreadth challenge to Paragraph C, nor do we imply
anything about the constitutionality of Paragraph C.
7

We exercise plenary review over legal questions and
review factual findings for clear error. United States v. Schiff,
602 F.3d 152, 160 (3d Cir. 2010); Lieberman v. Cambridge
Partners, LLC, 432 F.3d 482, 486 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that we
exercise plenary review over questions of statutory
construction).
13

capacities, are not “persons” under § 1983. Ngiraingas v.
Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 191-92 (1990); Brow v. Farrelly, 994
F.2d 1027, 1037 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[N]either the Territory of the
Virgin Islands nor its officers acting in their official capacities
are ‘persons’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). To determine whether
UVI was an instrumentality of the Territory of the Virgin
Islands, and therefore not a “person” for purposes of § 1983, we
look to the factors set forth in Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail
Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc).
Although the Fitchik factors were initially intended to determine
Eleventh Amendment immunity, our Court has extended their
use to § 1983. Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668,
670 (3d Cir. 2000).
We analyze three factors in applying the Fitchik test: “(1)
the source of the money that would pay the judgment (i.e.,
whether that source would be the state); (2) the status of the
entity under state law; and (3) the degree of autonomy the entity
has.” Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 239 (3d
Cir. 2005). The three factors should be treated as “co-equal[s]”
in the analysis. Id. at 240.
McCauley argues that the District Court’s analysis of the
Fitchik factors was “inconclusive” and that, as a result, it should
have focused on the first Fitchik factor, whether a judgment
against UVI would have affected the Virgin Islands treasury.
This argument fails. First, McCauley’s assertion that the
District Court’s analysis of the Fitchik factors was
14

“inconclusive” is belied by the record. The District Court, after
an exhaustive analysis of each factor, determined that two of the
three factors weighed in favor of UVI being an arm of the
Territory: UVI’s status under Virgin Islands law and its level of
autonomy. Only the funding factor weighed slightly against the
conclusion that UVI was an arm of the Territory. McCauley
does not challenge any of the District Court’s exhaustive
underlying fact-finding or legal reasoning and we decline to
speculate as to what motivated his accusation that the District
Court’s analysis was “inconclusive.” In short, we see no error
in the District Court’s application of the Fitchik factors.
Second, McCauley erroneously urges us to place additional
weight on the source of funding. Each Fitchik factor should be
treated as a “co-equal.” Benn, 426 F.3d at 240; Cooper v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 548 F.3d 296, 301-02 (3d Cir.
2008); Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 475 F.3d 524,
546 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, the District Court’s conclusion that
UVI was an arm of the Territory and not a “person” for purposes
of § 1983, was sound.
Because UVI is an arm of the Territory, Georges and
Ragster, in their official capacities at UVI, were likewise not
persons under § 1983. Ngiraingas, 495 U.S. at 192; Brow, 994
F.2d at 1037. “[A] suit against a state official in his or her
official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a
suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). “As such, it is no different from
a suit against the State itself.” Id. Accordingly, McCauley
15

cannot seek money damages against them. He may only seek
prospective injunctive relief. Id. n.10; see Brow, 994 F.2d at
1037 n.12 (noting that we cannot rule out the possibility of
“section 1983 actions for prospective injunctive relief against
territorial officials in their official capacities”).
IV.
Having disposed of the threshold questions of standing
and whether UVI, Georges, and Ragster are “persons” for
purposes of § 1983, we turn to the core of this appeal—the
application of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine to
the challenged Code paragraphs.8 We begin by outlining the
basics of the overbreadth doctrine, and then turn to applying
the doctrine to Paragraphs R, H, and B.
A.
The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine states that:

8

We exercise plenary review over legal questions
pertaining to the First Amendment. See Schiff, 602 F.3d at 160.
“Although we generally review a district court’s factual findings
for clear error, [i]n the First Amendment context, reviewing
courts have a duty to engage in a searching, independent factual
review of the full record.” ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181,
186 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16

A regulation of speech may be struck down on its
face if its prohibitions are sufficiently
overbroad—that is, if it reaches too much
expression that is protected by the Constitution.
[A] policy can be found unconstitutionally
overbroad if “there is a ‘likelihood that the
statute’s very existence will inhibit free
expression’” to a substantial extent.
Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243,
258 (3d Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted). “[C]ourts will not strike
down a regulation as overbroad unless the overbreadth is
‘substantial in relation to the [regulation’s] plainly legitimate
sweep.’” Id. at 259 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615). We
“vigorously enforce[] the requirement that a statute’s
overbreadth be substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but
also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep” in an
attempt to “strike a balance between competing social costs”:
On the one hand, the threat of enforcement of an
overbroad law deters people from engaging in
constitutionally protected speech, inhibiting the
free exchange of ideas. On the other hand,
invalidating a law that in some of its applications
is perfectly constitutional . . . has obvious harmful
effects.
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (emphasis
in original). “[T]he overbreadth doctrine is not casually
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employed.” Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting
Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999). “Because of the
wide-reaching effects of striking down a statute on its face . . .
we have recognized that the overbreadth doctrine is strong
medicine and have employed it with hesitation, and then only as
a last resort.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The first step in overbreadth analysis is to construe the
challenged statute; it is impossible to determine whether a
statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute
covers.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 293. The next step is to
determine “whether the statute, as we have construed it,
[pen]alizes a substantial amount of protected expressive
activity.” Id. at 297. Before striking down a policy as
overbroad, we must determine whether there is any “reasonable
limiting construction . . . that would render the policy
constitutional.” Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 259. “Every reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
B.
Our application of the overbreadth doctrine in this case
is informed by the “critical importance” free speech has in our
public universities:
[O]n public university campuses throughout this
country, . . . free speech is of critical importance
18

because it is the lifeblood of academic freedom.
As the Supreme Court in Healy v. James
explained, “the precedents of this Court leave no
room for the view that, because of the
acknowledged need for order, First Amendment
protections should apply with less force on
college campuses than in the community at large.
Quite to the contrary, ‘the vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools.’”
DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 314 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)).9 “It is well
recognized that [t]he college classroom with its surrounding

9

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957);
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding
academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us[,]
. . . [t]hat freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom.”); Healy, 408 U.S. at 180; see
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 835 (1995) (stating that the university has a “background
and tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of
our intellectual and philosophic tradition”); Papish v. Bd. of
Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 671 (1973) (per curiam)
(stating that “the First Amendment leaves no room for the
operation of a dual standard in the academic community with
respect to the content of speech”).
19

environs is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas[,] and [t]he First
Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult public
discourse.” Id. at 315 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Indeed, for this reason, and several others we will
elaborate on, our Circuit recognizes that “there is a difference
between the extent that a school may regulate student speech in
a public university setting as opposed to that of a public
elementary or high school.” Id. at 315. Public university
“administrators are granted less leeway in regulating student
speech than are public elementary or high school
administrators.” Id. at 316 (emphasis in original). “Discussion
by adult students in a college classroom should not be
restricted,” id. at 315, based solely on rationales propounded
specifically for the restriction of speech in public elementary
and high schools, see id. Cf. Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 260.
“Certain speech . . . which cannot be prohibited to adults may be
prohibited to public elementary and high school students.”
DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315 (emphasis in original); cf. Healy, 408
U.S. at 180.
We reach this conclusion in light of the differing
pedagogical goals of each institution, the in loco parentis role of
public elementary and high school administrators, the special
needs of school discipline in public elementary and high
schools, the maturity of the students, and, finally, the fact that
many university students reside on campus and thus are subject
20

to university rules at almost all times.
First, the pedagogical missions of public universities and
public elementary and high schools are undeniably different.
While both seek to impart knowledge, the former encourages
inquiry and challenging a priori assumptions whereas the latter
prioritizes the inculcation of societal values. Public universities
encourage teachers and students to launch new inquiries into our
understanding of the world. See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250; e.g.,
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) (“Many
church-related colleges and universities are characterized by a
high degree of academic freedom and seek to evoke free and
critical responses from their students.”) (plurality opinion). The
university atmosphere of speculation, experiment, and creation
is essential to the quality of higher education. Our public
universities require great latitude in expression and inquiry to
flourish:
To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would
imperil the future of our Nation. No field of
education is so thoroughly comprehended by man
that new discoveries cannot yet be made.
Particularly is that true in the social sciences,
where few, if any, principles are accepted as
absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers
and students must always remain free to inquire,
to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
21

understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die.
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250. Free speech “is the lifeblood of
academic freedom.” DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 314.
Public
elementary and high schools, on the other hand, are tasked with
inculcating a “child [with] cultural values, [to] prepar[e] him for
later professional training, and [to] help[] him to adjust normally
to his environment.” Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954); see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-79 (1979).
“The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public
schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics
class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a
civilized social order.” Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 683 (1986). As a result, “teachers—and indeed the
older students—[must] demonstrate the appropriate form of civil
discourse and political expression by their conduct and
deportment in and out of class.” Id. School attendance exposes
students to “role models” who are to provide “essential lessons
of civil, mature conduct.” Id. Public elementary and high
school education is as much about learning how to be a good
citizen as it is about multiplication tables and United States
history.
Second, “public elementary and high school
administrators,” unlike their counterparts at public universities,
“have the unique responsibility to act in loco parentis.” DeJohn,
537 F.3d at 315; e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684 (recognizing “the
22

obvious concern on the part of . . . school authorities acting in
loco parentis, to protect children—especially in a captive
audience—from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd
speech”).10 For example, the Sypniewski Court noted that New
Jersey law required school authorities to “hold every pupil
accountable for disorderly conduct” in school. Sypniewski, 307
F.3d at 259 (quoting N.J. Stat. § 18A:25-2). A similar statute
exists in every jurisdiction in our Circuit. E.g., Del. Code tit. 14,
§ 701; 24 Pa. Stat. § 13-1317; N.J. Stat. § 18A:25-2; V.I. Code
tit. 17, § 130. “Because of the duties and responsibilities of
public elementary and [high] schools, the overbreadth doctrine
warrants a more hesitant application in th[ose] setting[s] than in
other contexts.” Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 259. “[B]road
authority to control the conduct of [public elementary and high
school] students granted to school officials permits a good deal
of latitude in determining which policies will best serve
educational and disciplinary goals.” Id. at 260; accord Fraser,
478 U.S. at 684-86.
Public university administrators, officials, and professors
do not hold the same power over students. The authoritarian

10

We recognize that this in loco parentis relationship has
been diluted over time. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (explaining that
“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to . . .
students”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
23

college education of old, described in Justice Thomas’s
concurrence in Frederick v. Morse, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), has
long since been put to rest. Justice Thomas explained that in the
colonial era:
Even at the college level, strict obedience was
required of students: “The English model fostered
absolute institutional control of students by
faculty both inside and outside the classroom. At
all the early American schools, students lived and
worked under a vast array of rules and
restrictions. This one-sided relationship between
the student and the college mirrored the situation
at English schools where the emphasis on
hierarchical authority stemmed from medieval
Christian theology and the unique legal privileges
afforded the university corporation.”
Id. at 412 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Note, The
Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and
Proposal for Reform, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1135, 1140 (1991)
(footnote omitted)). The public university has evolved into a
vastly different creature. Modern-day public universities are
intended to function as marketplaces of ideas, where students
interact with each other and with their professors in a
collaborative learning environment. Indeed, students “often
have values, views, and ideologies that are at war with the ones
which the college has traditionally espoused or indoctrinated,”
Healy, 408 U.S. at 197 (Douglas, J., concurring). This is a far
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cry from the “one-sided relationship,” Morse, 551 U.S. at 412
n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring), that once existed.
Over thirty years ago, in Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d
135 (3d Cir. 1979), we recognized that “[w]hatever may have
been its responsibility in an earlier era, the authoritarian role of
today’s college administrations has been notably diluted”:
Trustees, administrators, and faculties have been
required to yield to the expanding rights and
privileges of their students. By constitutional
amendment, written and unwritten law, and
through the evolution of new customs, rights
formerly possessed by college administrations
have been transferred to students. College
students today are no longer minors; they are now
regarded as adults in almost every phase of
community life. . . . . [E]ighteen year old
students are now identified with an expansive
bundle of individual and social interests and
possess discrete rights not held by college
students from decades past. There was a time
when college administrators and faculties
assumed a role In loco parentis. Students were
committed to their charge because the students
were considered minors. A special relationship
was created between college and student that
imposed a duty on the college to exercise control
over student conduct and, reciprocally, gave the
students certain rights of protection by the
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college. The campus revolutions of the late
sixties and early seventies were a direct attack by
the students on rigid controls by the colleges and
were an all-pervasive affirmative demand for
more student rights. In general, the students
succeeded, peaceably and otherwise, in acquiring
a new status at colleges throughout the country.
These movements, taking place almost
simultaneously with legislation and case law
lowering the age of majority, produced
fundamental changes in our society. A dramatic
reapportionment of responsibilities and social
interests of general security took place.
Regulation by the college of student life on and
off campus has become limited. Adult students
now demand and receive expanded rights of
privacy in their college life including, for
example, liberal, if not unlimited, partial visiting
hours. College administrators no longer control
the broad arena of general morals. At one time,
exercising their rights and duties In loco parentis,
colleges were able to impose strict regulations.
But today students vigorously claim the right to
define and regulate their own lives. Especially
have they demanded and received satisfaction of
their interest in self-assertion in both physical and
mental activities, and have vindicated what may
be called the interest in freedom of the individual
will.
Id. at 138-40 (footnotes omitted).
26

The idea that public

universities exercise strict control over students via an in loco
parentis relationship has decayed to the point of irrelevance.
See Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating
that, under New York law, colleges do not act in loco parentis);
Freeman v. Busch, 349 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ince
the late 1970s, the general rule is that no special relationship
exists between a college and its own students because a college
is not an insurer of the safety of its students.”) (emphasis
omitted).
Closely related to the in loco parentis issue is the third
observation, that public elementary and high schools must be
empowered to address the “special needs of school discipline”
unique to those environs. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315-16. In
T.L.O., the Supreme Court, in discussing the scope of a public
high school student’s Fourth Amendment rights, stated that
teachers and administrators in public high schools have a
substantial interest in “maintaining discipline in the classroom
and on school grounds”: “Maintaining order in the classroom
has never been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has
often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime
in the schools have become major social problems.” T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 339; e.g., Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 112-15 (3d
Cir. 2000) (involving student accused of drug use). The
Supreme Court explicitly recognized that in a high school, “a
proper educational environment requires . . . the enforcement of
rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if
undertaken by an adult.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339. “Compulsory
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attendance laws automatically inhibit the liberty interest
afforded public school students, as the law compels students to
attend school in the first place [and] [o]nce under the control of
the school, students’ movement and location are subject to the
ordering and direction of teachers and administrators.” Shuman
v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 149 (3d Cir. 2005)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Unlike the
strictly controlled, smaller environments of public elementary
and high schools, where a student’s course schedule, class times,
lunch time, and curriculum are determined by school
administrators, public universities operate in a manner that gives
students great latitude: for example, university students routinely
(and unwisely) skip class; they are often entrusted to responsibly
use laptops in the classroom; they bring snacks and drinks into
class; and they choose their own classes.11 In short, public
university students are given opportunities to acquit themselves
as adults. Those same opportunities are not afforded to public
elementary and high school students.

11

It would be naive to assume that drug use and violent
crime are not issues in our public universities; that is not our
contention. Instead, we note that the concept of maintaining
discipline in a public university classroom is markedly different
from elementary and high school classrooms. In general, there
is no educational component to discipline in a university setting.
There is no demerit system for bad behavior or reward for good
behavior in the classroom. Nor is there a “conduct” grade on a
public university student’s grade report at the end of each term.
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Fourth, public elementary and high school administrators
“must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the
intended audience in determining whether to disseminate student
speech on potentially sensitive topics, which might range from
the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school setting to
the particulars of teenage sexual activity in a high school
setting.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272
(1988); see, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (noting concern that
“[t]he speech [at issue] could well be seriously damaging to its
less mature audience”); accord Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
592 (1992) (“[T]here are heightened concerns with protecting
freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the
elementary and secondary public schools.”). Considerations of
maturity are not nearly as important for university students, most
of whom are already over the age of 18 and entrusted with a
panoply of rights and responsibilities as legal adults. E.g., U.S.
Const. amend. XXVI; Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 12,
14 (1981) (explaining limited contractual capacity of “infants”);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that
individuals may not be given the death penalty for crimes they
committed while under the age of 18). “University students are
. . . young adults [and] are less impressionable than younger
students[.]” Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S 263, 274 n.14 (1981);
e.g., Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686 (“There is substance to the
contention that college students are less impressionable and less
susceptible to religious indoctrination.”).
Moreover, research has confirmed the common sense
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observation that younger members of our society, children and
teens, lack the maturity found in adults. The Supreme Court has
recognized, albeit while discussing juvenile offenders, that
“scientific and sociological studies . . . tend to confirm, [a] lack
of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are
found in youth more often than in adults.” Roper, 543 U.S. at
569 (internal quotation marks omitted). “These qualities often
result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]dolescents are
overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of
reckless behavior.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In
addition, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure,” id., and “the character of a juvenile is not as well
formed as that of an adult,” id. at 570. These conclusions were
recently re-affirmed in Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, 560
U.S. __ (May 17, 2010), where the Supreme Court stated that
“[n]o recent data provide reason to reconsider [its] observations
in Roper about the nature of juveniles.” Id., slip. op. at 17.
Finally, university students, unlike public elementary and
high school students, often reside in dormitories on campus, so
they remain subject to university rules at almost all hours of the
day. The concept of the “schoolhouse gate,” Tinker, 393 U.S.
at 506, and the idea that students may lose some aspects of their
First Amendment right to freedom of speech while in school, id.
at 507, does not translate well to an environment where the
student is constantly within the confines of the schoolhouse.
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“Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given
only to be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in
fact.” Id. at 513. Yet this is exactly what would occur for
students residing on university campuses were we to grant
public university administrators the speech-prohibiting power
afforded to public elementary and high school administrators.
Those students would constantly be subject to a circumscription
of their free speech rights due to university rules.
The reasons we have provided are by no means
exhaustive, but they are consistent with the view we espoused in
DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315-16, and Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 260.
Public universities have significantly less leeway in regulating
student speech than public elementary or high schools.
Admittedly, it is difficult to explain how this principle should be
applied in practice and it is unlikely that any broad categorical
rules will emerge from its application. At a minimum, the
teachings of Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, Morse, and other
decisions involving speech in public elementary and high
schools, cannot be taken as gospel in cases involving public
universities. Any application of free speech doctrine derived
from these decisions to the university setting should be
scrutinized carefully, with an emphasis on the underlying
reasoning of the rule to be applied.
V.
Applying the overbreadth doctrine to Paragraphs R, H,
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and B, the first two paragraphs fail to pass constitutional muster.
The last paragraph has a limited construction that would render
it constitutional. Each challenged provision is discussed in turn.
A.
McCauley challenges Paragraph R, which states:
R.

Misbehavior at Sports Events, Concerts,
and Social-Cultural Events:
(1)

The throwing of any article
into a crowd or onto a
playing field, court, or a
stage.

(2)

Alcoholic beverages of all
kinds are prohibited at
University sponsored events
unless permitted by
a p p ro p ria te U n iv e rsity
officials.

(3)

Displaying in the Field
House, softball field, soccer
field, cafeteria and
Reichhold Center for the
Arts any unauthorized or
obsc ene, of f ensive or
obstructive sign.
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McCauley focuses his challenge on subsection (3), which states
that a student may be punished for, inter alia, displaying any
obscene, unauthorized, or offensive sign in certain locations.
The District Court reasoned that the banning of obscene
messages was justified under Fraser, and that the banning of
unauthorized or offensive signs was justified under Hazelwood.
While we agree with the District Court that the banning
of obscene messages is not violative of the First Amendment,
we do so on different grounds. The reasoning underlying the
Fraser decision is simply inapposite. The Fraser Court
emphasized the nature of the school and the audience—a public
high school and impressionable teens. E.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at
683 (“The speech could well be seriously damaging to its less
mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on
the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.”). According to
the Supreme Court, the high school needed to “disassociate
itself [from the offending student’s speech] to make the point to
the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly
inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school
education.” Id. at 685-86. This interest in inculcating
fundamental values is not a priority in public universities. See
supra Part IV.B. Indeed, the Fraser Court recognized as much
when it noted that, in contrast to high school students, adults are
permitted to engage in “highly offensive” speech in certain
circumstances. Id. at 682 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971)).
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The age and maturity of the listener was a primary
concern of the Fraser Court. As support for its holding, the
Fraser Court looked to First Amendment jurisprudence outside
the context of schools that focused on the age of the listener to
show that there are “limitations on the otherwise absolute
interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where
the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may include
children.” Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684 (citing Ginsburg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (upholding statute banning sale
of sexually oriented material to minors, even though the material
was protected under the First Amendment for adults)). The
Supreme Court also noted that society had “an interest in
protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken
language.” Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684 (citing FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978)). The desire to protect
the listener cannot be convincingly trumpeted as a basis for
censoring speech for university students. Ultimately, these
machinations over the applicability of Fraser are unnecessary.
Obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment in any
context. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Thus, Paragraph
R’s banning of obscene speech is constitutionally sound,
regardless of Fraser.
The District Court’s reliance on Hazelwood to justify
Paragraph R’s punishment of “offensive” or “unauthorized”
signs fails on both fronts. First, Paragraph R’s use of
“offensive” is, “on its face, sufficiently broad and subjective that
34

[it] could conceivably be applied to cover any speech . . . th[at]
offends someone.” DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 317 (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Absent any requirement akin to a showing of
severity or pervasiveness—that is, a requirement that the
conduct objectively and subjectively creates a hostile
environment or substantially interferes with an individual’s
work [or study]—[Paragraph R] provides no shelter for core
protected speech.” Id. at 317-18. “[T]he mere dissemination of
ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state
university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of
‘conventions of decency.’” Papish, 410 U.S. at 670; see Tinker,
393 U.S. at 509 (stating that “mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint” is insufficient to justify prohibition of a
particular expression of opinion); Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 259
n.16 (noting that “mere offensiveness does not qualify as
‘disruptive’ speech”); Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240
F.3d 200, 215 (3d Cir. 2001). Second, the Hazelwood decision
does not speak to the issue of authorization. Neither UVI nor
McCauley discuss what procedures must be followed for a sign
to be “authorized” and the University Student Handbook does
not contain any procedures for authorization. Based on the
record before us, Paragraph R’s authorization requirement lacks
any criteria for determining whether authorization should be
granted and, thus, permits arbitrary, unpredictable enforcement
that is violative of the First Amendment. Cf. Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (“[A] law
subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the
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prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and
definite standards to guide the licensing authority is
unconstitutional.”).
Overlooking the fatal flaws of attempting to prohibit
“offensive” speech and requiring authorization for signs yet
providing no means for receiving authorization, and assuming
that Hazelwood applies in the university setting, the District
Court erroneously applied that precedent. While the District
Court correctly noted that “Hazelwood’s permissive ‘legitimate
pedagogical concern’ test governs only when a student’s schoolsponsored speech could reasonably be viewed as speech of the
school itself,” Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213-14, and that “school
‘sponsorship’ of student speech is not lightly to be presumed,”
id. at 214, it then determined, despite UVI’s failure to raise the
issue, that the displaying of signs by students in the Field House,
softball field, soccer field, cafeteria, or Reichhold Center for the
Arts may reasonably be viewed as UVI’s speech. It further
concluded that Paragraph R was reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.
Neither of these determinations was supported by the
facts or legal authority. Logic suggests that the District Court’s
assumption that signs displayed during sporting events, concerts,
and social-cultural events at the locations listed in Paragraph R
could be construed as school-sponsored speech was incorrect.
The more offensive or outlandish a sign is, the less likely it is
that people would attribute it to UVI. For example, in Morse,
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the Supreme Court summarily dismissed the application of
Hazelwood in a case involving a banner displaying the
nonsensical phrase: “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” Morse, 551 U.S.
at 397. Id. at 405. It did so because “no one would reasonably
believe that [the] banner bore the school’s imprimatur.” Id.
Similar reasoning would apply to offensive signs displayed by
UVI students. Indeed, the signs perhaps most likely to be
prohibited, those containing socially-valueless, extremely
offensive speech, would be the least likely to be seen as bearing
UVI’s imprimatur. See id. The District Court also assumed that
controlling the signs displayed at the locations identified in
Paragraph R served a legitimate pedagogical concern. The
record does not establish this determination and an assertion,
without any analysis, is simply not enough.12
There is no limiting, constitutional construction for
Paragraph R. The lack of any procedures explaining how signs
may be authorized for display is a procedural failure that is not
susceptible to a constitutional construction and the ban on
“offensive” signs is hopelessly ambiguous and subjective, see
DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 317-18. Paragraph R’s prohibition on
“obscene” speech is unproblematic, but the deficiencies in the
paragraph overwhelm the legitimacy of the ban on such speech.

12

In reaching our conclusion today, we decline to
consider whether the teachings of Hazelwood apply in the
university setting or whether Hazelwood is limited to curricular
activities.
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Its prohibitions on “offensive” and “unauthorized” speech have
no plainly legitimate sweep and may be used to arbitrarily
silence protected speech. See Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 259. As
such, we conclude that the paragraph is facially overbroad in
violation of the First Amendment.
B.
McCauley also challenges Paragraph H, which states:
H.

Conduct
Distress:

Which

Causes

Emotional

This includes conduct which results
i n p h ys ic a l m a n if es ta tio n s ,
significant restraints on normal
behavior or conduct and/or which
compels the victim to seek
assistance in dealing with the
distress.
The District Court concluded that because Paragraph H restricts
speech that causes extreme reactions, such as “physical
manifestations,” it covered only speech that significantly
interfered with the rights of others at UVI. As such, the District
Court held that the paragraph was lawful under Tinker.
“Conduct” is a broad term that encompasses all “personal
behavior” of a student.
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
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Dictionary 259 (11th ed. 2003). Speech protected by the First
Amendment is a type of “conduct,” as it is a personal behavior,
and is therefore regulated by Paragraph H. Notably, the
paragraph also regulates other conduct, such as “non-expressive,
physically harassing conduct [that] is entirely outside the ambit
of the free speech clause.” Saxe, 240 F.3d at 206.
Paragraph H, like Paragraph R, is entirely subjective and
provides no shelter for core protected speech. See DeJohn, 537
F.3d at 317-18. “Emotional distress” is a very loose concept.
The term “emotion” can mean anything from simply “a state of
feeling,” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 408, to “a
conscious mental reaction (as anger or fear) subjectively
experienced as strong feeling,” id. The term “distress” similarly
could connote an exceedingly minimal threshold of harm, as in
“to cause to worry or be troubled,” id. at 364, but it can also be
defined as requiring more, such as “pain or suffering affecting
the body, a bodily part, or the mind,” id. Even taking a narrow
understanding of “emotional distress,” it is clear that the term is
driven by the subjective experience of the individual. See id.
(defining “distress”).13 The best example of the subjectivity is

13

Attempts at connecting Paragraph H to a legal
definition of “emotional distress” fail. The Virgin Islands
recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress, e.g. Louis
v. Caneel Bay, Inc., 50 V.I. 7, 20 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2008), but the
“[e]xtreme and [o]utrageous conduct,” id. (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46(1)), necessary to assert such a claim does
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the last prong of the paragraph—“conduct . . . which compels
the victim to seek assistance in dealing with the distress.” This
prong prohibits speech without any regard for whether the
speech is objectively problematic. The fact that the provision
only lists a few non-exclusive examples of when it may be
invoked does not help its case for constitutionality. Emotional
distress for purposes of Paragraph H “includes” the examples
listed in the paragraph, but it also includes other scenarios that
are not illustrated in the paragraph.
The scenarios in which this prong may be implicated are
endless: a religious student organization inviting an atheist to
attend a group prayer meeting on campus could prompt him to
seek assistance in dealing with the distress of being invited to
the event; minority students may feel emotional distress when
other students protest against affirmative action; a pro-life

not bear any clear relationship to free speech. Not all extreme
and outrageous conduct involving speech is necessarily
unprotected by the First Amendment. Moreover, the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress requires intent on the
part of the tortfeasor. Id. No such intent element is required
under Paragraph H. The Virgin Islands also recognize negligent
infliction of emotional distress, e.g., Fenton v. C&C Constr. &
Maint., Inc., 48 V.I. 263, 276 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2007), but that tort
requires the plaintiff have been in danger and have suffered
some physical harm as a result of the emotional distress. Id. No
similar requirements exist for Paragraph H.
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student may feel emotional distress when a pro-choice student
distributes Planned Parenthood pamphlets on campus; even
simple name-calling could be punished. The reason all these
scenarios are plausible applications of Paragraph H is that the
paragraph is not based on the speech at all. It is based on a
listener’s reaction to the speech. “The Supreme Court has held
time and again, both within and outside of the school context,
that the mere fact that someone might take offense at the content
of speech is not sufficient justification for prohibiting it.” Saxe,
240 F.3d at 215; see Papish, 410 U.S. at 670; Tinker, 393 U.S.
at 509; Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 259 n.16. While “[t]he precise
scope of Tinker’s ‘interference with the rights of others’
language is unclear” it is “certainly not enough that the speech
is merely offensive to some listener.” Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217.
Also, the Tinker doctrine may only be invoked to address
“substantial disruption[s] of or material interference with school
activities[.]” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. Here, a lone individual
who has a negative reaction may subject the speaker to
disciplinary proceedings. That simply was not what was
envisioned in Tinker:
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression.
Any departure from absolute regimentation may
cause trouble. Any variation from the majority’s
opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in
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class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that
deviates from the views of another person may
start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our
Constitution says we must take this risk,
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); and
our history says that it is this sort of hazardous
freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis
of our national strength and of the independence
and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in
this relatively permissive, often disputatious,
society.
Id. at 508-09.
Given that Paragraph H may be used to punish any
protected speech, without forewarning, based on the subjective
reaction of the listener, we conclude that its overbreadth is
substantial in an absolute sense and relative to its plainly
legitimate sweep. In doing so, we do not deny that there are
instances where Paragraph H may be invoked and the First
Amendment is not implicated: for example, where a student
engages in “non-expressive, physically harassing conduct,”
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 206, that causes emotional distress, or where
a student engages in obscene speech that causes emotional
distress, see generally Miller, 413 U.S. 15; Roth, 354 U.S. 476.
But the blanket chilling of all protected speech is still substantial
in relation to these other types of conduct that may be prohibited
under the paragraph. Every word spoken by a student on
campus is subject to Paragraph H. Every time a student speaks,
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she risks causing another student emotional distress and
receiving punishment under Paragraph H. This is a heavy
weight for students to bear. Moreover, other provisions of the
Code could be invoked to punish students for non-expressive
conduct or unprotected speech that causes emotional distress:
for example, Major Infraction Paragraph B prohibits assault and
infliction or threat of bodily harm to a person; General
Infraction Paragraph A prohibits negligent bodily harm; and
Major Infraction Paragraph D prohibits sexual harassment. On
top of the Code, there are numerous Virgin Islands statutes that
prohibit conduct that may cause emotional distress. E.g., V.I.
Code tit. 14, § 292 (defining assault and battery); V.I. Code tit.
14, § 1022 (defining obscene and indecent conduct). Because
these other avenues for punishment exist, in striking a “balance
between competing social costs,” Williams, 553 U.S. at
292—the chilling of protected speech in a university setting,
which is harmful to the core mission of the university, see supra
Part IV.B, balanced against the harm caused by the subset of
conduct that causes emotional distress and cannot be punished
under other Code provisions or Virgin Islands law (if any even
exist)—we conclude that the harm done to students’ speech
rights is substantial and requires vindication.
Paragraph H has no reasonable, limiting constitutional
construction. The District Court concluded that Paragraph H
includes only speech that significantly interferes with the rights
of others at UVI. But construing the paragraph that narrowly
would ignore the use of the word “includes” and the prohibition
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on conduct “which compels [a] victim to seek assistance in
dealing with . . . distress”—a broad, subjective prohibition for
which no objective indicia are offered to explain when the
provision would be violated. As such, we conclude that
Paragraph H is overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.
C.
Finally, McCauley challenges Paragraph B, which states:
B.

Verbal Assault, Lewd, Indecent or
Obscene Conduct or Expressions on
University Owned or Controlled Property
or at University Sponsored or Supervised
Functions.

At trial, McCauley conceded that he had no desire to engage in
the behaviors described in Paragraph B and the District Court
dismissed his challenge, concluding that he had failed to
establish a cognizable injury. Because McCauley need not show
injury to himself to assert a facial challenge to Paragraph B, see
supra Part II, we will evaluate his claim on the merits.
McCauley asserts that Paragraph B is overbroad because
it captures speech that is protected, namely lewd, indecent, or
obscene conduct. Paragraph B has a reasonable limiting
construction that saves it from unconstitutionality. See
Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 259. “Lewd,” “indecent,” and
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“obscene,” could collectively be interpreted to prohibit only
speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment under the
Miller obscenity test, see Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25. Thus,
Paragraph B, on its face, does not violate the First Amendment.
VI.
McCauley also asserts that the District Court erred by not
deciding his as-applied challenge to Paragraph E. The District
Court’s conclusion that Paragraph E was unconstitutional on its
face rendered adjudication of McCauley’s as-applied challenge
unnecessary. It appears that McCauley raised this issue in hopes
of receiving the $200 he paid in fines for his violation of
Paragraph E and letters of apology from UVI employees.
McCauley cannot seek money damages from Ragster and
Georges. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71. There are no allegations that
the two UVI employees, in their individual capacities, harmed
McCauley. See supra Part III. Without such allegations, there
is no question that Georges and Ragster cannot be ordered to
pay money damages to McCauley, so adjudication of his asapplied challenge would serve no purpose. McCauley’s request
that we require UVI officials to write letters of apology was not
raised in the District Court and he cites no authority supporting
his request. We decline to grant him that relief.
VII.
In conclusion, UVI, Georges, and Ragster were rightly
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deemed not to be “persons” for purposes of § 1983. On remand,
McCauley’s challenge to Paragraph C should be dismissed for
lack of standing because any injury from that paragraph was not
based on chilled speech. The District Court’s dismissal of
Paragraph B for lack of an injury should be reversed and
judgment should be entered in favor of Georges and Ragster
because that paragraph has a limited, constitutional construction.
The other two paragraphs, Paragraphs H and R, are largely
subjective and lack limiting constructions to save them from
violating the First Amendment. Therefore, on remand, the
District Court should enter judgment in favor of McCauley and
against Georges and Ragster (in their official capacities) with
respect to both those paragraphs. The other aspects of the
District Court’s judgment should remain undisturbed.
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